On January 3, U.S. Army forces carried out a military operation to arrest Nicolás Maduro, President of Venezuela. This military action falls within the framework of the United States’ new hemispheric vision, as described in the document National Security Strategy, published by the White House in November 2025. The document reaffirms the right of the United States to protect its political and economic interests throughout the Americas, under what it calls the Trump Corollary, an adaptation of the Monroe Doctrine to the realities of the 21st century.
A few hours after the operation, in a speech by President Trump, it was announced that the United States would be responsible for temporarily guiding Venezuela’s future during its transition to democracy. It was also stated that priority would be given to protecting U.S. companies’ investments in Venezuela. At the same time, the country’s leadership was handed over to the Venezuelan vice president, the Chavista Delcy Rodríguez.
This analysis aims to anticipate future movements and changes in the Venezuelan telecommunications market. Among the assumptions underpinning this vision are a gradual erosion of international criticism of U.S. intervention in Venezuela, a successful transition to democracy, and a committed effort to modernize the Venezuelan legal framework. Such modernization would seek, among other objectives, to increase security, attract foreign investment, and strengthen government institutions and agencies. This process will take several years and will likely involve periods of high tension among the various actors in Venezuela’s political and economic landscape.
I acknowledge that this analysis adopts an optimistic stance regarding the possibility that one of the region’s former epicenters of technological innovation and specialized telecommunications journalism may reclaim its leading role. This includes resuming leadership positions in multilateral organizations such as the Inter-American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL) or the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), roles it regularly held during the 1990s.
At this point, a necessary digression is warranted, as many of Latin America’s pioneers in specialized telecommunications coverage come from the homeland of Simón Bolívar. Names such as Víctor Suárez, Edgar Rincón, William Peña, and the late Antonio da Silva Campos Campos are figures that any serious student of Latin American telecommunications should know, listen to, read, and learn from.
Thanks to their efforts, we have remained informed about developments in Venezuela over the past two decades, especially following the nationalization of CANTV in 2007. This event marked the beginning of the decline of the Venezuelan telecommunications sector.
Today, the Venezuelan telecommunications market is characterized by its lag in adopting new technologies, due to prevailing macroeconomic conditions, the erosion of purchasing power, and government corruption, which artificially increase the cost of doing business in the country. At the national level, the mobile segment is dominated by Digitel and Movistar, alongside Movilnet, the mobile division of the fixed-line operator CANTV. Smaller players such as Inter and Thundernet also exist. Others, such as Patriacell, the name given by the government to Movilmax after its expropriation, are examples of the consequences of clumsy state intervention to the detriment of the population.
The consequences are clear: service quality is suboptimal, and the geographic expansion of new technologies is slow. Although efforts have been made in recent years to improve networks and promote new services, Venezuela remains far from achieving usage levels comparable to those of Chile, Uruguay, or Brazil, some of the region’s leaders.
In the short term, Venezuela needs continued investment in terrestrial fiber-optic infrastructure that matches or exceeds the 36,000 km outlined in the National Telecommunications Plan 2025–2030. Technologies such as 5G, the use of fiber optics as a broadband platform rather than merely a data transport medium, increased content creation (an area heavily damaged during the Chavista period), and a renewal of the country’s device ecosystem are urgent priorities. This must be complemented by opening an attractive market for low-Earth-orbit satellite constellations, thereby strengthening their regional presence in the coming years.
Infrastructure renewal will be accompanied by private-sector investment to modernize the country as it reconnects with countless international markets for goods and services. For example, increased security will act as a catalyst for revitalizing tourism in a country blessed with extraordinary natural beauty.
A key requirement for these changes and investments is the establishment of a modern, flexible regulatory framework. In the short term, efforts should focus on developing a clear roadmap for allocating Venezuela’s radio spectrum, setting rules that encourage the entry of new market players, and, above all, dismantling the existing state infrastructure for civilian surveillance and media censorship.
A new legal framework would also serve as a starting point for Venezuelan delegations in international organizations and for dialogue with neighboring countries interested in developing cross-border telecommunications projects that benefit all parties. Past complaints about the National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL) ‘s lack of response, from Aruba and Curaçao to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Brazil, must be left behind.
Naturally, one essential resource Venezuela must repatriate is its human talent. Many of the experts who were forced to emigrate are precisely those who must return to advance the country’s new course. Achieving this will require incentives and the creation of well-paid jobs for individuals with expertise that is difficult to replicate locally. These same professionals will directly and indirectly support academic institutions in developing the talent needed for the coming years.
One issue that remains surrounded by uncertainty is the U.S. government’s desire to implement the so-called Trump Corollary, which states:
“We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere.”
As can be inferred, this could generate pressure in the awarding of concessions or contracts to certain companies, causing discomfort among non-U.S. investors and potentially polarizing segments of Venezuelan politics. It is clear that technology policy aimed against China—particularly Huawei—is a central pillar of the Trump administration, which further declares:
“Non-Hemispheric competitors have made major inroads into our Hemisphere, both to disadvantage us economically in the present, and in ways that may harm us strategically in the future. Allowing these incursions without serious pushback is another great American strategic mistake of recent decades.”
Should these rules be forcibly applied, market development could be disrupted, as many companies currently operating in Venezuela are not accepted in the United States. It is also plausible that U.S. interest will focus more on securing access for American companies to the exploitation of strategic resources such as coltan—critical for electronic devices—oil, and others.
From a market-dynamics perspective, what changes might be observed in Venezuela? As mentioned earlier, low-Earth-orbit satellite platforms such as Starlink, AST SpaceMobile, and Amazon LEO view Venezuela as an important market, given the underdevelopment of infrastructure, particularly in remote and rural areas. The potential role of companies such as SpaceSail (Qianfan) or GalaxySpace remains uncertain due to their Chinese origin.
Changes among the three national operators will likely stem from the need to raise significant investment capital. In this context, CANTV/Movilnet could once again be put up for sale—some 19 years later—at a price lower than anticipated in 2006, when América Movil was the main interested party. However, the Mexican giant may have other options, such as Movistar, which has a stronger market presence, better network quality, and a higher-income customer base than the state operator. América Movil could pursue a strategy similar to that in Colombia, acquiring fixed-line operators to reach middle- and upper-income households and areas with high concentrations of SMEs and large corporations. In this sense, cable operators such as Inter, NetUno, and Cablevision would be prime acquisition targets.
Other operators—such as Fibex, Patriacell, and Thundernet—could also become acquisition targets for companies seeking market entry, diversification, or portfolio expansion. These developments, however, pose a threat to CANTV, which urgently requires a capital injection to aspire to reclaim the role it held in the market two decades ago.
Ultimately, Venezuela’s challenge will be attracting buyers beyond América Móvil. Should this occur, competitive pressure would fall heavily on Digitel, which would strive to maintain its position as the leading technological innovator while simultaneously expanding its network to compete with multinational giants.
Regardless of what the future holds for Venezuela, what truly matters is that change improves the country’s current situation and prevents it from sinking into stagnation. The road will not be easy, but there is little doubt that Venezuelans themselves will implement the necessary changes so that one of Latin America’s richest countries can rejoin inter-American dialogues focused on development through artificial intelligence, telecommunications, and information and communication technologies (ICT).
