Over the past twelve months, Washington, DC, has adopted three immigration measures that, in the long term, may prove counterproductive for the United States. First, it imposes a $100,000 fee on H-1B visas; second, it modifies the H-1B lottery to favor highly paid positions; and third, a final rule eliminates indefinite duration-of-status treatment for foreign students. Taken together, these initiatives close the two channels that allowed the United States to increase the number of scientists and engineers working in the country: graduate study with practical training and direct H-1B sponsorship. Conversely, these measures make Brazil more attractive as a place to retain human capital and even become a talent hub for people working at technology research and development companies.
In September 2025, Proclamation 10973 imposed a one-time $100,000 fee on new H-1B petitions for workers outside the United States. However, on June 8, 2026, a federal judge in Boston struck it down in its entirety, calling it an unconstitutional tax. The Trump administration obtained a brief stay of that decision, reinstating the payment, but on July 24 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit declined to keep the stay in place, leaving United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) “without a legal basis to collect it” for the time being. A court in Washington, DC, had already upheld the fee, so the legal landscape remains divided, and the proclamation is set to expire on its own on September 20, 2026, unless renewed.
For Brazil, as for other countries, especially those in the BRICS bloc, the opportunity stems precisely from the current chaos in the U.S. immigration legal framework and the insistence of public-policy decision-makers on measures that are counterproductive for a country that seeks to be a pillar of artificial-intelligence development and a technological leader in digital infrastructure.
Unlike China or India, which account for 73% of applications for this visa, Brazil has never been a major player in the H-1B program. Although Brazil receives only a few thousand H-1B visas per year, the visa represents an important channel for Brazilians who want to turn a U.S. graduate degree into a career in Silicon Valley. The new “weighted selection” system for the 2027 lottery, announced in December 2025, adds another obstacle to this path.
On July 17, 2026, DHS eliminated the duration-of-status system for F-1, J-1, and I visas. The decision replaces it with fixed admission periods, generally capped at four years, requiring many students—especially highly valuable STEM doctoral students—to apply for extensions with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. This measure increases bureaucracy and the risk of approval delays, which can result in highly qualified students losing jobs even though they have historically been essential to the country’s position as the global epicenter of technology.
However, what matters most for Brazil may not be who leaves, but who stays, given that the domestic information and communications technology (ICT) and telecommunications sectors are already large enough to absorb this talent. For now, these sectors do not depend on imported labor and, because they generate formal, well-paid jobs, they are becoming an increasingly competitive alternative to an uncertain U.S. immigration policy for those seeking an H-1B visa.
Changes to this visa may encourage companies to place their international hires in countries such as Brazil, where they can conduct research and collaborate in developing local human capital. This could undoubtedly lead Brazil, as well as its counterparts in the BRICS bloc, to make work authorization easier for international talent and thereby continue strengthening the country as Latin America’s leading technology-development hub.
It is important not to assume that the current situation solves Brazil’s human-capital problems in STEM fields. Nevertheless, the immediate consequence of the anti-immigrant xenophobia prevailing in U.S. public-policy decisions is that it becomes easier for Brazil to address its shortage of qualified personnel. For example, an engineer who once aimed for Silicon Valley now has genuine alternatives at home, although the country still needs all of them for its digital transformation.
If, in response to this situation, Brazil joins the list of countries that have created or strengthened programs specifically designed to take advantage of the tightening of U.S. H-1B policy, it could encourage the arrival of international talent that drives growth in the domestic technology sector. This strategy is not new; it has already been adopted by countries that stand out in technological development, such as Canada, China, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.
The most important mechanism linking U.S. visa policy to the future of Brazil’s ICT sector is not emigration, but where U.S. companies locate work they cannot fill domestically. The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond estimates that a permanent 10% reduction in skilled immigration would cost the welfare of U.S. natives about $2.9 billion annually, largely because companies move functions abroad.
Every dollar of friction the United States adds to hiring foreign talent creates an incentive to expand engineering capacity in nearby hubs such as Brazil, whose value proposition—time-zone overlap, increasingly widespread English fluency, a mature startup ecosystem, rapidly growing domestic demand, and expanding infrastructure—remains underexploited. The greatest opportunity lies in simplified tax frameworks that allow Brazilian professionals to work remotely or as contractors for foreign companies without emigrating, capturing foreign currency and knowledge without losing talent or the tax base.
Over the past 12 months, U.S. immigration-policy decisions have been clumsy, shortsighted, and counterproductive in the long term. They initially focused on the H-1B visa; then came restrictions on its lottery designed to limit it to highly paid jobs; and finally, as a further blow, the imposition of a four-year cap on student status, together with a shorter grace period, creating new obstacles to practical training and, eventually, to the number of students entering doctoral programs.
In summary, Washington, DC, has made the path Brazilian talent traditionally followed to reach U.S. technology employers more complex. This instability erodes the predictability of that route, regardless of whether each measure survives appeal. Meanwhile, Brazil’s ICT and telecommunications sectors generate enough formal employment, rising wages, and AI-driven demand to make staying home a competitive option, even as a structural talent shortage persists.
The challenge is to turn this moment into a lasting advantage: invest in STEM education and connectivity, and adopt tax policies that favor remote work, attract human capital, and accelerate Brazil’s development as a global technology hub. Brazil should position itself not as a consolation prize when visas are blocked, but as the preferred technology destination in the Americas for local manufacturing, research, and development.
